On Government, Governance and Judicial Review: The Case of European Competition Policy by LEHMKUHL, DIRK
On Government, Governance and Judicial
Review: The Case of European Competition
Policy
DIRK LEHMKUHL European Policy Analysis, University of Zurich
ABSTRACT
From a traditional rationalist principal-agent framework, the development
of the European Community’s competition policy could appear as a
straightforward story of agency loss. However, the recent overhaul
of competition policy, which the Community presented in terms of
decentralisation, appears to have changed the story. We are confronted
with the uncommon event of an agent (the European Commission)
returning some of its powers to the principals (the member states). This
paper resolves the puzzle by highlighting the role of the Commission and
of European courts. It has become part of the Commission’s strategy to
pursue its objectives through legally non-binding instruments such as
notices or guidelines or co-operation in networks. These instruments do not
need the approval of the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament.
With the Commission’s promotion of new modes of governance, the link
between sectoral governance (in terms of regulation specific to competition
policy) and the governmental shadow of hierarchy shifted to an increasing
extent to judicial review by European courts. Alongside this shift, the
character of judicial review has changed in the direction of judicial control,
as European courts no longer restrict themselves to review of the legality of
Commission actions, but also engage in assessing the facts themselves.
 Introduction
In the terminology of principal-agent theory, the development of the
European Community’s competition policy might be read as a pretty
straightforward story of agency loss or escape (Wilks a). With the
objective of establishing proper control over market-disturbing practices,
the founding states of the EC (as the principals) delegated competences in
the area of competition policy and law to the European Commission (as
the agent). Over time, the principals found that the agent did much more
than merely fulfil the expectation of credibly monitoring markets.
Rather, the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG
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Comp) has developed into a powerful actor in the realm of European –
and increasingly international – competition policy. Close observers
have described this development as an astonishing transformation of
competition policy from a ‘ sleepy, ineffectual backwater of Community
administration’ (Wilks and McGowan : ) into the ‘ first supra-
national policy’ (McGowan and Wilks ). Accordingly, viewed
through our principal-agent lens, the story of European competition
policy becomes one in which the member state principals see themselves
increasingly confronted with a supranational agent, with preferences of
its own, which has repeatedly acted against the preferences of at least
some member state principals. At the same time, the principals found
that their control mechanisms to address agency loss were quite limited.
Without the alternative of reversing the clock, governments have two
basic avenues to pursue. They may accept the well-established functional
structure of competition policy, and seek to influence the balance in the
multilevel structure of European competition policy between the supra-
national competences of the Commission on the one hand, and national
competition authority and courts on the other. The continuous struggle
for financial thresholds as criteria for the division of labour between the
national and the supranational level illustrates these efforts. Alternatively,
governments may seek to maintain control over future developments in
European competition policy. The recent debate on the competences of
national financial regulators displays the tension between national
governments’ public support for the consistent application of European
competition rules and their attachment to national champions and
national control.
Thus far, the story of agency loss is in accordance with traditional
applications of rationalist principal-agent frameworks to European com-
petition policy (Bulmer ; Pollack , ). However, the story
becomes somewhat more complicated when we focus on how agent
slippage has occurred in practice and how the most recent reform of
European policy on mergers and acquisitions fits in. As the latter sails
under the flag of decentralisation, it has been interpreted as a quite
uncommon event in which an agent (the European Commission) returns
some of its powers to the principals (the member states) or at least shares
some of its powers with other agents (national competition authorities) of
their principals (Wilks a: ). To understand how the Commission
has managed actually to expand its powers in the sectoral governance of
European competition policy, we must introduce the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) into the equation. The ECJ has frequently backed the
Commission’s efforts to expand competition provisions beyond their
original reach. It has done so not only with respect to Commission
decisions in individual cases, but also when commenting on the
 Dirk Lehmkuhl
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Commission’s increasingly common practice of referring to legally
non-binding instruments. Today, together with the Court of First
Instance (CFI), the ECJ is the most important control mechanism in
European competition policy. And yet, as will be shown, it is not a
straightforward task to interpret judicial review in principal-agent
terminology.
In what follows, I will address both questions – the role of the
European Commission and that of European courts – with a focus on this
special issue’s interest in the linkage between sectoral governance and
territorially bound democratic governance. The article starts by present-
ing some basic information on European competition policy and its
development with respect to some important sub-domains: state aids,
mergers and antitrust issues. It continues by analysing the Commission’s
ongoing tactic of referring to legally non-binding instruments and the
subsequent approval of this practice by European courts. The article
concludes by reviewing the insights on government, governance and
judicial review in the area of competition policy in the light of
principal-agent theoretical assumptions.
 Competition policy in Europe
.. The rough picture
With the general objective of ensuring the undistorted operation of the
internal market, competition policy encompasses a broad range of
targets, including the fight against monopolies, oligopolies, cartels and
market-sharing arrangements as well as against subsidies and state
protection. The economic justification for addressing these issues is that
their resolution will help achieve a more efficient allocation of resources,
promote innovation, lower consumer prices and thereby increase societal
welfare. As these objectives chime with the purpose of economic
integration in Europe as formulated in the Treaties of Paris and Rome,
the explicit inclusion of competition policy was coherently reasonable.
Although the final wording of the Treaty of Rome did not entail
far-reaching competences for the European Commission as had
been allocated to the High Authority under the Treaty of Paris, the
Commission still enjoyed substantial powers from the very beginning,
including the power to decide, implement and enforce policies (Allen
; Pinder : –).
Competition policy provisions in the Treaty of the European
Economic Community included restrictive practices in Article  EEC
(in the Treaty of Amsterdam Art.  TEC), monopolies and abuse of
dominant positions in Article  (Art.  TEC), monopolies in Article 
Government, Governance and Judicial Review 
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(Art.  TEC) and, finally, state aids in Articles – (Arts. – TEC).
The procedural regulation to these articles, Regulation /, not only
provided the European Commission with substantial powers, but also
protected it from the intergovernmentalist backlash that occurred in the
Council in the mid-s (Allen : ). Regulation  put the
European Commission in a very strong position in relation to companies
and provided the it with a monopoly on granting exemptions to
behaviour that was otherwise prohibited (Art.  () TEC).
The formal inclusion of competition policy in the Treaty of Rome did
not imply that the actual development of Commission activities in the
different dimensions of EC competition policy was linear and even.
For instance, before the late s there was no substantial control of
state aid, and the liberalisation of utilities and competition policy
activities began only in the late s (Wilks b: ). Concerning the
European Commission’s control over private companies, antitrust
policies – with their two areas of restrictive practice and abuse of
dominance – development differently. While in the realm of the
former the Commission was able to use its extensive discretion to
develop decisions that usually gained approval from the ECJ, it was
not until the early s, with the encouragement of the CFI, that
the Commission was able to establish a more certain legal grounding
(ibid.: ). Finally, control of mergers and acquisitions, which tends to
attract media attention because of the frequent involvement of well-
known companies, was omitted from the Treaty of Rome, essentially
because it was not thought of as a priority by the member states (Ho¨lzler
: ).
.. Linking governance to government, new modes of governance and
judicial review
Let us now turn to a quick overview of issues and milestones in European
competition policy. Roughly speaking, while the first twenty-five years of
European competition policy were characterised by a separation of
national and European competition policies, from the mid-s onwards
there has been greater integration into one functional area. Paradigmatic
for the first phase was the ‘ double-barrier’ theory established by the ECJ
in the case of Walt Wilhelm (case /), according to which agreements
between private parties must satisfy both Article  EEC and national
law (Goyder : ). A feature of the later development was the
continuous debate on the degree of centralisation or decentralisation and
the formal division of competences between the European and the
national level within the functional area of European competition policy
(Dabbah : ).
 Dirk Lehmkuhl
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In what follows, I will present a more fine-grained analysis, which
provides more detailed insights into the link between sectoral governance
and territorially bound government. A closer look at two areas of
competition policy, each with a different history – state aid control and
the control of mergers and acquisitions – sheds some light on the
dynamics linking government to governance, looking especially at new
modes of governance and judicial review by European courts.
Control of state aid
As part of European competition policy, state aid control under Articles
– TEC is not only of practical relevance for national and sub-national
activities: what is more, it links the European level and the member states
in politically sensitive areas such as industrial subsidisation or regional
policy. Whereas Article  TEC generally bans direct or indirect state aid
that has the potential to distort competition, the same article also permits
exemptions in particular circumstances. Paragraph  lists conditions that
make aid automatically compatible with EC provisions (e.g., aid to make
good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences)
and enumerates circumstances that may be compatible (such as aid to
promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living
is abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment). Member
states are obliged to notify the Commission, which is at the centre of the
EC’s state aid control system, of aid schemes. Via the Council, member
states may determine the procedural rules under which the Commission
operates.
Secondary legislation played, however, only a minor role in the design
of rules governing state aid control, and it took until  for the member
states to agree to adopt official regulations (Council Regulations /
and /). As a consequence, the Commission had to navigate in very
sensitive areas in which support by the member states, as the targets of
Commission activities, could not be taken for granted (Wilks b: )
and in which intra-organisational tensions between different directorates
general of the Commission were quite common. Interestingly, there was
a shift in the strategy of the Commission or, perhaps more precisely, in
that of what was then Directorate General IV: faced with resistance to
enacting provisions on state aid control by the member states in the s
and s, the Commission was less and less inclined to formalise its
powers in the s and s (Cini : ).
Instead, as early as , the Commission used informal modes of
influencing the behaviour of its interlocutors. With its first informal
instrument – a letter to the member states in which the Commission laid
down the principles of its strategy to deal with state aid in the clothing
and textile industries – the Commission established a practice of applying
Government, Governance and Judicial Review 
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legally non-binding instruments. It uses them, for instance, to interpret
treaty provisions, to clarify procedural questions, to explain its own case
law or that of European courts, and to establish the orientation of its
future policy objectives. The instruments include guidelines, notices,
communications, recommendations and, as just mentioned, even letters
(Aldestam : ). Of course, many of the objectives could have also
been accomplished by regulations. Yet, from the perspective of the
Commission, soft law instruments had the advantage of combining
time-effectiveness, flexibility, policy stability and credibility, while retain-
ing the most discretion possible (Cini : ). Sometimes policy
framework is used as a generic term to describe the function of legally
non-binding instruments issued by the Commission (Aldestam ).
In the Commission’s efforts to accomplish the task of a historic move
‘ away from state subsidy of industry and, indeed, from traditional
industrial policy’ (Wilks b: ), two factors proved important.
The launch of the common market programme changed the intra-
Commission balance between the competition and the industrial DGs in
favour of the former. What is more, the Commission was backed by the
ECJ and the CFI. For instance, in the dispute between some member
states and the Commission on the question of whether Article () EEC
(() TEC) applied only to existing and new state aid schemes, it was an
ECJ judgement (case /, Italy vs Commission) that authoritatively
confirmed the Commission’s power to apply the provisions also to
non-notified cases. An important decision contributing to the ‘ sea
change’ in the evolution of the Commission’s state aid policy (Allen :
) is the ECJ’s award in the dispute between the Commission and Philip
Morris (case /, Philip Morris vs Commission). The subject of the
case was the subsidies granted to Philip Morris by the Dutch government,
which were considered by the Commission to be incompatible with EC
provisions. Reacting to the appeal, the ECJ established the principle that,
in applying Article () TEC, the Commission may assess the economic
and social implications of a state aid in a Community context.
European courts were not only involved in judicial review of the
Commission case decisions, but also in its practice of referring to legally
non-binding instruments. While the ECJ generally acknowledged the
Commission’s competence to use its discretion to ensure the smooth and
proper implementation of Community policies, certain judgements were
more restrictive. Some examples may illustrate this point. In France vs
Commission (case C-/), the ECJ stated that the Commission’s
policy frameworks must clearly set out their legal basis in order to
become binding. In the context of the Commission’s policy framework
dealing with state aid to the motor vehicle industry, the ECJ had to
decide in a series of cases between the Commission and Spain. The ECJ
 Dirk Lehmkuhl
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
01
43
81
4X
08
00
08
10
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
1:
06
:4
0,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
acknowledged the Commission’s competence to establish rules – under
exceptional circumstances – without the agreement of the member states
(C-/). A couple of years later, however, the ECJ emphasised
the conditionality of this Commission competence and annulled a
Commission decision because the exceptional requirements were not
given at the time of the action (C-/). Yet in another case the ECJ
emphasised that, for reasons of legal certainty, the policy frameworks in
state aid policy are binding on the Commission. In the case CIFRS vs
Commission (C-/), the ECJ stated that the Commission had to
abide by a policy framework established in , and that any departure
from this policy required the agreement of the member states.
Merger and antitrust policy
The control of mergers aims to outlaw those mergers and acquisitions
that have the potential to distort competition. European regulation on
mergers and, more generally, antitrust issues brings the Commission in
direct contact with business in the member states, and cases frequently
gain a substantial degree of public attention (e.g. the cases of
Pfizer/Pharmacia, General Electronics/Honeywell and Vodafone/
Mannesmann). Although the Treaty of Rome lacked any relevant
provisions, the Commission conceived mergers, acquisitions and joint
ventures as a potential source for anti-competitive behaviour from the
very beginning. Given the omission of provisions in the Treaty and faced
with continued resistance from key member states (France, the UK,
Germany) to the delegation of further competences to the European
level, the Commission has repeatedly tried to use Articles  and  EEC
(Arts.  and  TEC) to achieve control over mergers. In so doing, it was
on several occasions backed by judgements of the ECJ (Ho¨lzler : ;
McGowan and Cini : ). For instance, in the Continental Can
judgement (case /), the ECJ approved the Commission’s action to
regulate the concentration of the industry with Article  EEC on abuse
of dominant position. Also, in the tobacco industry judgement on Philip
Morris (cases  and /), the ECJ stated that Article  EEC not
only refers to restrictive market practices but also may be applied to
mergers.
While disagreement within the Council repeatedly blocked the
Commission from formally delegating competences in the area of merger
control, the Commission’s substitute strategy of stealthily extending its
competences led to a substantial degree of legal uncertainty. By the
mid-s both its conceptual approach and its practice faced consider-
able criticism from industry as well as from some member states.
Germany and the UK in particular criticised merger control policy as
too lax and too politicised; in the s they called for an independent
Government, Governance and Judicial Review 
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European merger control agency (McGowan and Wilks ). At
the same time, the Commission faced additional difficulties. While its
move to address state monopolies in public utilities was not especially
welcomed by the member states, a lack of precision and stringency in the
interpretation of the concept of market position led both the ECJ and the
CFI to override Commission decisions on several occasions (McGowan
and Cini : ; McGowan and Wilks : ; Morgan ).
Finally, the steady increase in the number of cartel, antitrust and merger
activities since the mid-s and the increasingly extraterritorial
dimension of merger control activities – with the Commission’s interven-
tions in the case of Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and General Electronic/
Honeywell being only the most visible cases (Morgan and McGuire
) – made existing problems in the established regulatory framework
only too apparent.
Because of the continuing resistance of some member states, the
first European merger control regulation became effective only in
 (Council Regulation /). A critical point in the debate was
the relationship between the European Commission’s competences in
addressing merger cases and those at the national level. In particular,
those countries with well-established control agencies, such as Germany
and the UK, opposed what they saw as the excessive dominance of the
European Commission. The compromise established absolute turnover
thresholds allowing for a ‘ necessarily arbitrary’ determinant of
jurisdiction – either the Commission’s or a member state’s – on a case-
by-case basis (Morgan : ). A second important conflict revolved
around the balancing of conflicting criteria, with Germany and the UK
favouring a strict competition policy and France wanting to include social
and industrial policies in merger control (Pollack : ).
Notwithstanding the fact that the  merger control regulation
granted the European Commission, for the first time, proper control
competences in the realm of mergers and acquisitions, the reality of an
increasing workload made the situation precarious again shortly after
its enactment. The Commission continued its practice of using bloc
exemptions (granting approval to an entire class of cases according to
Article () TEC) and so-called comfort letters (interim measures
relieving companies from future fines in the case of a negative decision by
the Commission) to meet the deadlines of its control regime. However,
actual economic developments soon rendered the new regulatory frame-
work unsatisfactory. The more the single European market took shape,
the more strained were the Commission’s resources; as a consequence,
the enforcement of Articles  and  TEC became more and more
critical. In this situation, decentralisation became an ever more appealing
option for the Commission (McGowan and Wilks :  n. ), and it
 Dirk Lehmkuhl
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launched a fundamental overhaul of its merger control and antitrust
policy. Following the issuing of green and white papers on merger control
and an interim amendment of the  merger regulation in , the
Council of Ministers adopted a new legal framework for the enforcement
of Articles  and  TEC in  (European Commission ;
European Commission ; Council of the European Union ).
Entering into force in May , the new legal framework of
Regulation / replaced the forty-year-old system of Regulation
/. Most importantly, the regulation implies a new approach to the
implementation and enforcement of the antitrust and merger control
policy of Articles  and  TEC, with the key words being ‘ decentralis-
ation’ and ‘ modernisation’. Decentralisation refers to the devolution of the
policing of anti-competitive behaviour and of complaint-handling to the
European family of competition authorities: the national competition
authorities and the European Commission, linked through the European
competition network. The concept of modernisation captures the new
priorities of the Commission’s enforcement agenda, such as private
enforcement of company activities in national courts.
While the new regulation provides the skeleton of the new regulatory
regime, some important questions have been left open, including: the
scope of exemption provisions according to Article () TEC; the
clarification of criteria for case allocation; and measures to ensure a
harmonised application of European provision by national competition
authorities (e.g. leniency provisions). The Commission has put flesh
on the bones of the new regulation by adopting an implementation
regulation plus (by the time of writing) more than twenty notices and
guidelines to address the questions and to provide guidance on various
aspects of the enforcement of the Articles  and  TEC.
These activities indicate that, as with state aid control, the Commission
has established a practice of referring to legally non-binding measures in
the area of antitrust policy. For instance, the Commission’s first notice on
agreements of minor importance which are expected not to restrict
competition under Article () TEC (‘ de minimis Notice’) was published
in  and has since been revised several times. In addition, comfort
letters, as quick and informal means, allowed the Commission to decide
on cases by communicating to companies that their agreement does not
infringe Article () TEC.
With respect to the judicial review of legally non-binding instruments,
the ECJ’s practice has been quite permissive. It granted the Commission
the competence to use guidelines to indicate the directions of its policies
(ECJ in Agranda Zucker und Sta¨rke vs Commission ()) or to use
administrative guidelines to lay down ‘ policy rules’ for the exercise of its
discretion (ECJ in Netherlands vs Commission ()). At the same time,
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European courts confirmed their position that administrative guidelines,
which have an abstract-general scope of application, may not be
implicitly amended by decisions in individual cases. Although both the
ECJ and later the CFI frequently allowed the creeping extension of
supranational competences through Commission decisions, they main-
tained a strict review policy. In particular the CFI reached a number of
judgements (Airtours/First Choice (T-/ and T-/), Schneider
Electric (T-/) and Tetra Laval (T-/ and T-/)) in which it not
only overturned Commission decisions, but also explicitly criticised the
Commission’s economic expertise, its use of evidence and its procedures
(OECD : ; Wilks b: ).
 Assessing links, actors and impacts
Thus far, I have presented information about fundamental developments
in almost fifty years of history of competition policy in Europe as well as
about basic factors that have influenced these developments. Recalling
occasionally tough Commission decisions, in particular in the area of
state aid, member states were reluctant to provide the Commission with
more explicit and detailed competences to fight effectively against any
restriction or distortion of market competition. The Commission’s
strategy of expanding its competences involved both the creeping
exploration of new jurisdictions and the increasing reference to legally
non-binding instruments. Both strategies were frequently encouraged by
European courts which became, over time, the most important control
mechanism over Commission actions and decisions. In what follows, I
will address each of these aspects with attention to the link between
sectoral governance and territorially bound democratic government.
. Member states as principals
In outlining the analytical framework of this special issue, He´ritier and I
introduced some basic assumptions about the properties of principals and
the relationship between principal and agent. In accordance with the
theoretical principal-agent literature, important properties are preference
constellations in the case of multiple principals, the distribution of
information between principals and agents, and the organisational
arrangements and decision rules within which the principals might
exercise their control powers (see also Pollack ).
The first important aspect that needs to be taken into account is related
to the fact that, in the context of European integration, we deal with
multiple principals. This necessarily implies a multiplicity of national
preferences that have to be accommodated before a unified voice of the
 Dirk Lehmkuhl
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principals can be heard. This is not to say that individual government
actors had no impact on the history of European competition policy. For
instance, during the depression in the mid-s the member states
exercised significant pressure on the Commission to relax its control of
governmental industrial policy interventions (Allen : ).
Later, in the mid-s, discontent with the Commission’s policy and
control practice led some governments to call for a recontracting, i.e.
structural change involving the attribution of control competences to an
independent European agency. The concern about the Commission’s
exercise of European competition policy arose from different sources:
France, which had just successfully defeated the Commission on state aid
and mergers, basically supported a maintenance of the status quo in the
pursuit of competition policy and the distribution of competences
between the national and the European level; Germany’s position, apart
from the question of the politicisation of Commission decisions, was
dominated by a concern about the creeping centralisation of compe-
tences in merger control – the most important field of activity for the
resource-rich German national competition authority; finally, the UK
shared concerns about the politicisation, transparency and consistency of
Commission decisions and supported a greater recourse to national
competition authorities (Wilks and McGowan : ).
This brief summary of positions of key national governments under-
scores that there was some discontent with the operation of the agent. At
the same time, the positions of the principals were still too heterogeneous
to be consolidated within the voting procedures in the Council. Rather,
different perspectives on the institutional design of a European cartel
office and different preferences of the individual principals prevented the
disempowerment of the agent. In a similar vein, member states were not
able to take the opportunities provided by intergovernmental conferences
to significantly ‘ clip the wings’ of European competition policy
(McGowan and Cini : ).
In sum, both ‘ inability or unwillingness’ of the member states and the
‘ weight of the original treaty provisions’ (ibid.) limited the ability of
member state principals to constrain the agent’s behaviour. Instead, these
factors enabled the Commission to pursue its policy path almost
undisturbed by democratically legitimated actors, including the Council
and the European Parliament. Put differently, the influence of the
shadow of hierarchy by territorially bound democratic government on
the efficiency of sectoral governance was quite limited. In turn, it was the
Commission’s strategy to increase the efficiency of its policies by resorting
to new modes of governance that bypassed both the member states and
the European Parliament. Next, I will address the operational mode of
sectoral governance.
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New modes of governance
Apart from its case decisions, legally non-binding instruments are of the
utmost importance for the Commission as modes of governance in
competition policy. The Commission’s mandate to apply instruments
outside the provisions of Article  TEC derives from Article  TEC,
which states that ‘ to ensure the proper functioning and development
of the common market’ the Commission has to ‘ ensure that the
provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions
pursuant thereto are applied’ and may ‘ formulate recommendations or
deliver opinions on matters dealt with in this Treaty, if it expressly so
provides or if the Commission considers it necessary’ (Article  TEC,
points  and ). Under changing labels such as soft law, quasi-legislation,
informal regulation and policy frameworks, these measures include guidelines,
declarations, codes of conduct, notices, communications, letters and
interpretations.
These measures are not new nor are they restricted to Commission
activities. Since the early s, there has been an intense scholarly
debate focusing primarily on issues such as proper definitions and the
legal quality of soft law instruments (e.g. Beveridge and Nott ; Mo¨rth
; Snyder ). Criteria for the classification of soft law instruments
referred inter alia to their origin, their content or their resemblance to
either national measures or international private law. For instance, with
a focus on the function of non-binding measures, one classification
distinguishes between informative or preparatory instruments such as papers
(green, white or action) and informative communications, steering instru-
ments with pre-regulatory functions such as recommendations, and
interpretative or decisional instruments such as guidelines and notices that
spell out ways in which the Commission judges a specific behaviour (e.g.
Brammer ; Cosma and Wish ; Hoffmann ).
Among the specific features of these instruments not included in Article
 TEC is that none of these measures requires Council or Parliament
approval. Not only does administrative policymaking occur outside the
Council and Parliament, but – given the Commission’s information
advantage deriving from the incorporation of input from experts and
interest groups via hearings and comments in the drafting of papers,
notices and guidelines – governance by non-binding rules also strength-
ens the position of the European Commission in procedural and
substantial terms vis-a`-vis national competition authorities and national
courts. For instance, in a frequently cited case from the arena of social
policy (occupational diseases), the ECJ stated that ‘ national courts are
bound to take recommendations into consideration in order to decide
disputes submitted to them, in particular where they cast light on the
interpretation of national measures adopted in order to implement
 Dirk Lehmkuhl
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them or where they are designed to supplement binding Community
provisions’ (case C-/: ).
Also, in times of uncertainty about the interpretation of specific
provisions via Commission notices, guidelines and the like may gain a
much more binding character in practice. Two examples underline this
point. To start with, take the European Competition Network, com-
prising the Commission and national competition authorities: given the
economic and legal complexity of cases, there is some truth in the
observation that being a fully fledged member of the European family
of competition authorities largely depends on endowment with the
appropriate powers of surveillance, investigation and enforcement. At the
moment, however, there seem to be different classes of family member-
ship, with some members – the British, French, German and Italian
agencies in addition to DG Comp – being in the top tier in terms of
budget and case load, while the majority of others lag behind (Riley :
; Wilks : ). Also, the knowledge and experience of the national
competition authorities are highly unequal in the member states. On the
one hand, it is only since  that all member states have had a national
competition law. On the other, frequently either the national provisions
differed from the Europe approach in their underlying philosophy or
there was very little contact between national authorities and European
provisions (Riley : ). Both factors tend to favour the position of
the Commission and its efforts to influence the operation of competition
enforcement via legally non-binding instruments. The actual relevance of
this observation is underlined by a practitioner’s view according to which
member states might well have felt ‘ neglected and ploughed over’ by the
Commission’s practice of governing by legally non-binding instruments
(Aldestam : ).
Looking at the sector level – and more and more often Commission
interventions based on competition law are sector interventions in cases
of either mergers and acquisitions (e.g. in telecommunications) or abuse
of dominant position (e.g. in energy) – there is some plausibility in the
statement that companies are well advised to follow Commission guide-
lines on pain of being subject to antitrust law investigations (see Geradin
and Sidak : ). In conjunction with the importance of precedents set
by Commission decisions, soft means strengthen the Commission’s role
in procedural and substantial terms in relation not only to national
competition authorities, but also to national courts.
At the same time, legally non-binding instruments are neither neutral
nor static. Rather, they must be interpreted with respect both to the
interinstitutional politics in the multilevel European polity and to their
change over time. On the institutional politics dimension, Cini has
convincingly argued that the Commission makes strategic choices for
Government, Governance and Judicial Review 
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either hard or soft law. For instance, after repeated unsuccessful efforts to
persuade the principal to enact a regulation on merger control, the
Commission has learned that its soft laws – which need neither Council
nor Parliament approval – are a vital alternative to help exercise control
in all areas of competition policy. The Commission even resisted Council
pressure to draft Council regulation under Article  TEC (Cini :
).
A second interesting point relates to the observation that soft law
instruments develop over time. On the one hand, they may harden as
legally non-binding instruments of the Commission are replaced by
legally binding Council regulations. For the state aid regime, Aldestam
and Cini have identified such transformations. They distinguish between
substantial matters, in which soft law complements hard law, and
procedural matters, in which hard law replaces soft law (Aldestam :
; Cini : ). The transformation from hard to soft law may aim at
ensuring compliance where voluntaristic approaches have failed. An
important force in this hardening is the judgements of European courts,
with the stance of the CFI being firmer than that of the ECJ.
Accordingly, Cini interprets the ultimate willingness of the Commission
to draft state aid regulations ‘ as a way of pre-empting further more
restrictive procedural judgements by the courts’ (: ). Along similar
lines, court judgements have added specific impetus to legally non-
binding instruments. For reasons of legal certainty, legitimate expectation
and equal treatment, legally non-binding modes of governance may
produce a legal effect not on the addressees but on the Commission (joint
cases C-, , , , / P, Dansk Rørindustri and others vs
Commission) (e.g. Aldestam : ; Hoffmann : ). But neither
of these tendencies implies that the soft law of sectoral governance
prepares the ground for government. Rather, the rules of the sectoral
governance may harden and may contribute to its centralisation over
time.
Judicial review
The debate about the contribution of European courts to the develop-
ment of sectoral governance in European competition policy now leads
us on to the issue of judicial review. Indeed, as frequently mentioned,
judicial review by European courts has gained the utmost importance
in the making of competition policy. So far, European integration
theory has established that the interplay of the Commission and the
ECJ – rather than the conventional policymaking triangle of Council,
Commission and European Parliament – fuels a supranational pull
(Burley and Mattli ; Weiler ). This observation is based on the
pattern of court decisions that have later been exploited by the
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Commission, with the Van Gend en Loos and Cassis de Dijon cases
being the most prominent (Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia ). With few
exceptions, the European political science literature has given much less
attention to judicial review as a means of controlling the Commission’s
policymaking via case decisions and soft modes of governance.
In particular, a body of literature similar to that on the US judicial
oversight of administrative agencies is largely missing at the European
level. It is, however, possible to extract some insights from findings on
constitutional review and research in the realm of social-legal and admin-
istrative studies (Hertogh and Halliday ). While the constitutional
review literature addresses the validity of norms enacted by the traditional
legislative process, that on social-legal and administrative studies is more
concerned with the scrutiny of the executive branch’s compliance with
public law. The latter aspect, especially, points to differences between
national traditions of judicial review and control. For instance, the
English model may be characterised as rights-based approach, in which
the rule-of-law focus of review is at odds with a review of policy substance
of administrative rule-making. This is in stark contrast to the US
‘ separation of powers’-focused, institutional design model, in which we
find a strong inclination towards control over administrative rule-making
not only in procedural but also in substantial terms (Cane ).
Following this observation, it would be interesting to know whether –
following the European emulation of the US-style regulatory state
model – judicial review at the European level will again experience a
development similar to that of the United States. In the American case,
Shapiro has identified that, alongside an extension of the delegation of
rule-making competences to administrative bodies and independent
agencies, courts established demanding judicial review policies and struck
down administrative rules themselves (and not merely their individual
application) on both procedural and substantial grounds (Shapiro ).
For a long time, the situation in the EU was different. European courts
were relatively reserved in exercising the powers of Article  TEC to
review legally non-binding measures of the Commission. If they did so,
the focus was either on the individual application (as in the annulment of
the policy framework of state aid for the motor vehicle industry) or on
general features, such as the Commission’s competence to provide
guidance by administrative rather than legislative means. The same was
true also for court review of Commission decisions.
As a long-time CFI judge explains, the court defines its role in terms
of judicial review rather than full judicial control: ‘ Our task is to review
the legality of what has been done. But this is a very different thing from
a judge trying a case himself’ (Bellamy : ). In a similar vein, the
current president of the CFI, Bo Vesterdorf, states that the ‘ CFI simply
Government, Governance and Judicial Review 
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checks whether or not the Commission correctly applied the law as
interpreted by the Community Courts’; in addition, it controls the facts.
While in neither of these two arenas is there ‘ room for discretion on part
of the Commission’ (Vesterdorf : ), it does have discretion when
assessing the facts. Yet, in practice, the analytical distinction between law
and facts with unlimited judicial review on the one hand and the
assessment of facts with limited judicial review on the other is not as clear.
As another former CFI judge has described, the procedure of review of
the Commission’s discretionary decisions necessarily has to test the
soundness of the Commission’s appraisals. By so doing, however, ‘ judges
are obliged to examine the administrative file, thereby inevitably bringing
themselves intellectually close to building their own bridge from the facts,
via the legal framework of the case, to a legal outcome in casu’ (Tiili and
Vanhamme : ).
The question of whether or not the CFI exceeds its competences under
Article  TEC by assessing the facts rather than limiting its review to
the control of the law and of the facts was the subject of a Commission
appeal to the ECJ. In , the Commission prohibited a merger
between Tetra Laval and Sidel, two companies active in the industry for
liquid food packaging, on the grounds of risk of the abuse of dominant
market position. Redefining core economic concepts such as conglomerate,
the CFI came to the conclusion that the Commission had failed to
produce convincing evidence; it therefore annulled the Commission’s
decision due to a manifest error of assessment of facts. In turn, the
Commission filed an appeal to the ECJ firstly on substantial grounds
(contesting the standard-of-proof criteria) and secondly on the grounds
that the CFI had exceeded its jurisdiction under Article  TEC by not
restricting its review to the question of whether or not the Commission
had made a ‘ manifest error of assessment’. With respect to the second
point, the ECJ confirmed that the Commission has a certain degree of
discretion in the economic assessment of facts. At the same time,
European courts act in accordance with their competences when
reviewing the Commission’s assessment of information and economic
implication of a specific activity.
Overall, it can be said that the ECJ and the CFI have intensified their
examination of Commission practices over time. The interpretation of
the scope and depth of judicial scrutiny has been significantly extended.
The more the CFI has stretched the limits of its judicial scrutiny, the
more the margins of the Commission’s discretion have diminished (Bailey
: ). The European courts’ changing interpretation of their role
indicates that judicial review is not a static concept. It also implies that
the differentiation between judicial review and judicial control may and,
in the present case, has diminished. The increasing relevance of the CFI
 Dirk Lehmkuhl
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finds also expression in numerical terms. As of September , the CFI
has issued thirty-one judgments under the EC merger regulation and it
has annulled nine Commission decisions (Bailey : ). In sum, it
seems legitimate to argue that the European model of judicial review is
indeed moving in the direction of the American model, with its stronger
substantial impetus.
Conclusion
One might start the conclusion by characterising the role of the European
Commission. The literature suggests a number of portrayals: it is the ‘ first
among equals’ in the European competition network (Maher : ); it
is ‘ more than an agent in state aid’ and, even more in line with Majone
(), it ‘ has become as a trustee of the competition rules’ (Wilks b:
, ). These portrayals indicate that applying a principal-agent per-
spective not only can provide interesting insights into the relationship
between territorially bound government and sectoral governance in the
realm of EU competition policy, but also, what is more, it can take us very
close to the limits at which the approach is applicable.
The starting point was the limited willingness of the member states to
delegate proper competences to the Commission in the functional area of
competition policy. Viewed positively, over time the Commission, as the
agent of the national governments, managed to cope quite successfully
with this incomplete vertical integration (see Eberlein, in this issue).
Backed by the European Court of Justice in its strategy of expanding its
jurisdiction, the Commission established itself at the heart of a quite
powerful competition policy regime in the EU. Given the heterogeneity
of the principals and their disagreement about central issues, the shadow
of hierarchy remained relatively pale.
More negatively, such an interpretation tends to underrate the
complexities of modern administrative processes in the EU’s multilevel
setting. Instead, it seems necessary to acknowledge a dynamic and an
interdependence that make modern administrative patterns two-way
streets, rather than one-way efforts of principals seeking to control agents
(Krause ). Especially in the European multilevel constellation, the
changes over time have become akin to in-built institutional features.
The actual patterns of change are related not so much to the behaviour
of single actors but instead to two-way signalling processes of the actors
in the system. In the case of competition policy, the interdependence of
member states and the Commission (and the courts) can frequently be
traced. On the one hand, the shadow of governmental hierarchy became
visible not only through the budget, but also through the threat of
recontracting, i.e. by reallocating regulatory competences from the
Government, Governance and Judicial Review 
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Commission to a European central competition agency. A more recent
example is the new French president’s intervention about the role of
competition policy in Europe’s Reform Treaty at the  EU summit in
Berlin. On the other hand, the Commission sent both accommodating
and threatening signals to the member states. For instance, its relatively
lackadaisical control regime in the period of institutional crisis (‘ Euro-
sclerosis’) signalled an awareness of the strain put on the member states’
capacity for collective action. At the same time, the Commission did
not hesitate to take a firm stand against the resistance of large member
states as well (Bu¨the and Swank ). The recent annual Report on
Competition Policy documents the Commission’s practice of combining
different instruments, including advocacy and fines, to achieve its
objectives (European Commission ).
Notwithstanding the foregoing ambiguous assessment, the principal-
agent perspective has helped us gain insights into the relationship
between government and governance. As has been shown, it was the
Commission’s strategic behaviour rather than the shadow of hierarchy
that has in large part spurred efficiency gains. In recent years, part and
parcel of its strategy has been the increasing use of legally non-binding
instruments such as notices or guidelines. For the Commission, these
instruments have the advantage that they need approval neither of
the Council of Ministers nor of the European Parliament. With the
Commission’s promotion of new modes of governance in the area of
competition policy, the link between sectoral governance in terms
of regulation specific to competition policy and the governmental shadow
of hierarchy shifted, to an ever larger extent, on to the mechanism of
judicial review by European courts.
The role of European courts in general and the relationship between
the courts and the Commission in particular are disputed in the literature
that takes a principal-agent perspective. For the present topic –
interaction between territorially bound government and sectoral
governance – it is necessary neither to define the status of European
courts nor to address the reason for the delegation of dispute resolution
to a third party by the member states. Rather, even when displaying
their teleological vision on the integration process in general and on the
goal of the single market programme in particular, the decisions of
European courts have been based on the legal framework established by
the member states. Within this framework, judicial review of Commission
decisions by the ECJ and the CFI has certainly been the most important
control mechanism for member state governments (as well as for
individual companies) in the area of competition policy.
The effect of judicial review both on administrative decisionmaking by
cases and soft modes of governance and, more generally, on institutional
 Dirk Lehmkuhl
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development in the EU is twofold. For one, we might expect a positive
impact on the overall efficiency of European competition policy, which
may find expression in a higher degree of legal certainty, in more
coherence in the Commission’s application of new modes of governance,
and in a less disputed distribution of cases between national and
supranational jurisdictions. Also, the increasing backing of Commission
decisions and instruments on economic reasoning might be related to the
criticism of Commission decisions by European courts.
At the same time, judicial review tends to contribute to a creeping
supranationalisation of both de facto and de jure competences. On the
one hand, we have a supranational rather than an intergovernmental
actor supervising a supranational agent. On the other, it is not too
far-fetched to argue that the focal point of this supranational judicial
review will be European rather than national. A good case in point is the
CIF case, in which the ECJ emphasised the ‘ European role’ of national
competition authorities as well as national courts in competition cases.
And, finally, as judicial review establishes a legal rather than a political
discourse, the emergence of new modes of governance does not neces-
sarily break the spell of integration through – supranational – law as is
sometimes assumed in the literature on legally non-binding instruments.
It remains to be seen whether a bureaucratic-judicially dominated
character will restrict the politicisation that has long been present in
European competition policy.
NOTES
. ‘ Financial Regulators Oppose EU Reform’, Financial Times,  Oct. , p. .
. Governance of competition policy is cross-sectoral rather than sectoral.
. ‘ Exceptional circumstances’ occurred when there was shown to be an ‘ overriding need to maintain
undistorted competition in the motor vehicle industry’.
. The cases are not linked to the aforementioned Philip Morris case in state aid matters.
. See ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/legislation.html (last visited  June
).
. For the following, see cases T-/, Tetra Laval vs Commission (Tetra Laval I) [] ECR II-
and C-/ P, Commission vs Tetra Laval (Tetra Lava II) [] ECR I-.
. For the controversial debate, see e.g. Alter ; Alter and Meunier-Aitsahalia ; Burley and
Mattli ; Pollack ; Garrett .
. Case C-/ Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) vs Autorita` Garante della Concorrenza e del
Mercato, Judgement of ..; see Nascimbene .
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